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1 Introduction
Tobacco consumption is exposed to various forms of regulation in many countries. His-
torically, taxation is the rst instrument used by governments, initially mainly as a
revenue-raising device, subsequently also as a mean to limit tobacco consumption.1
While still widely employed, during the last decades an expanded array of instruments
 such as smoke-free-air laws, information-campaign programs about smoke-related
diseases, bans on advertising, restrictions of youth access to tobacco products  have
gained importance complementing taxation as tobacco control policies. Indeed, the em-
pirical evidence on the U.S.A. reported in Section 2 shows that prevention programs, as
well as smoking restriction laws, are used jointly with taxation and play an important
role, both quantitatively and qualitatively. However, while the theoretical underpin-
nings of tobacco taxation have a long history that we briey review in Section 2, those
of other types of control policies are still limited.2 The rst purpose of this paper is to
investigate how non-price regulatory instruments add to and interact with taxation in
the design of tobacco control policies.
Another important factor in tobacco control policies is the role played by special
interest groups. Again, although the evidence reported in Section 2 for the U.S.A. shows
that powerful lobby groups are active in attempting to lean tobacco control policies
towards their goals, the theoretical literature has paid no attention to this issue.3 To
ll this gap is the second purpose of this paper.
We develop a framework in which a policy maker can use three types of regulatory
instruments: (i) an excise tax that discourages tobacco consumption by increasing
its price, (ii) prevention programs that a¤ect consumption by inducing smokers to take
decisions that are more time consistent when comparing the pleasure of current tobacco
1For instance, in the UK, excise duty on tobacco was rst introduced in 1660 (Report on tobacco
taxation in the United Kingdom, WHO). In the U.S., the rst federal excise tax on tobacco products
was introduced in 1862, while the rst state tax was introduced in Iowa in 1921 (Tax Foundation).
The Australian government has imposed an excise tax on tobacco products since 1901 (Australian
Government, The Department of Health).
2A notable exception is the model by Adda and Cornaglia (2010), who focus on the interplay among
bans, taxes and passive smoking. Instead, several empirical papers have investigated the impact of
taxation and other control policies on tobacco consumption (e.g., Chaloupka and Wechsler, 1997;
Evans et al., 1999, Adda and Cornaglia, 2006, Chaloupka et al., 2010, Chaloupka et al., 2012). A
comprehensive discussion of the issues involved in tobacco regulation is in Gruber (2001).
3There are, instead, some empirical papers investigating the impact of lobbying by the tobacco
industry on policy choices (e.g., Givel and Glantz, 2001; Morley et al., 2002).
2
2
consumption with its future health harm, and (iii) smoking bans, such as free-air laws,
that directly restrict consumption. Our theoretical model of smoking behavior is based
on the framework developed by ODonoghue and Rabin (2005, 2006) and K½oszegi (2005)
to examine the socially optimal level of taxation of a harmful good.4 We extend their
setup in three directions, namely (i) by introducing the two regulatory instruments
referred to above,5 (ii) by assuming that tobacco is traded in an oligopolistic market,
instead of a perfectly competitive one, and (iii) by considering the role of special interest
groups.6
First, we take a normative perspective and study the optimal mix between the three
types of instruments assuming that a benevolent policy maker maximizes the aggregate
surplus of the economy. We then move to a positive perspective by allowing for the
possibility that the choices of the planner are inuenced by interest groups representing
the parties a¤ected by control policies: tobacco producers, smokers and non-smokers.
We thus evaluate the distortions in public policy, if any, induced by lobbying activities.
We consider a population partitioned into two groups of individuals: smokers and
non-smokers. Smokersare assumed to be heterogeneous along several dimensions, such
as the intensity of preferences for smoking, the size of future health harms caused by
current tobacco consumption, the degree of self-control in smoking, and the sensibility
to public awareness programs. We also distinguish between smoking causing external
harms to other individuals (like that occurring indoor) and that imposing no external
costs (like that occurring outdoor). Regulation, in the form of smoking bans aimed
at curbing external costs, is applicable only to the former category of tobacco con-
sumption, with smokers di¤ering also in terms of the costs su¤ered to comply with the
ban.
4Other models, in particular Gruber and K½oszegi (2004), provide a more articulated characterization
of tobacco consumption, focusing also on dynamic issues. Bernheim and Rangel (2004) develop a
framework, based on evidence from neuroscience, in which the consumption of harmful goods is due
to mistakesthat are triggered by environmental cues. Their model is particularly appropriate for the
analysis of consumption of highly addictive substances.
5ODonoghue and Rabin (2006) refer primarily to junk food, while K½oszegi (2005) focuses also
on benecial goods (like exercise) and on the role of market solutions (two-part tari¤s, non-linear
pricing) besides public intervention. As for taxation and prevention programs, also our analysis can
accommodate harmful goods di¤erent from tobacco, like alcoholic drinks, drugs, or unhealthy food.
Regulation by means of smoke-free air laws is instead obviously specic to tobacco consumption.
6Also Haavio and Kotakorpi (2011) introduce political-economy considerations into the framework
of ODonoghue and Rabin (2006), but by means of a median-voter model.
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Our normative analysis shows how prevention policies and smoking restrictions can
usefully complement taxation in controlling tobacco consumption. Ideally, a set of
individual-specic taxes (i.e., taxes tailored to match the characteristics of individual
smokers and the possible externalities) would allow to implement an allocation that is
rst-best e¢ cient, hence making other instruments redundant. However, individual-
specic taxes are unfeasible in practice, because of lack of information and high admin-
istrative costs. Therefore, policy makers must rely on a second-best uniform tax on all
smokers, which in turn calls for the introduction of additional policy instruments target-
ing specic ine¢ ciencies. Our analysis shows how prevention programs and smoking
restrictions, although unable to restore the rst-best for the same reasons indicated
above, prove very useful in mitigating the ine¢ ciencies that are left unaddressed by
uniform taxation.
In particular, our results show that the optimal excise tax is a su¢ cient instrument
for correcting the ine¢ ciencies arising from the behavior of the averagesmoker and
those stemming from the market power of tobacco producers. However, by targeting
the average smoker, the optimal uniform tax does not properly account for individuals
heterogeneity in terms of health harms, degree of self-control, receptiveness to preven-
tion programs. Furthermore, by simply correcting for the average external harm, it
does not properly account for the fact that di¤erent acts of smoking in unregulated
contexts may exert di¤erent external harms to other individuals.7
As for prevention policies, we show that their optimal level crucially depends on the
variance of health harms for smokers. Intuitively, for the smokers su¤ering an health
harm above the average level, it is socially benecial to induce a further decrease in
tobacco consumption, in addition to the one already achieved through taxation. The
opposite holds for smokers with health harm below the average. This is exactly what
can be achieved through prevention policies, the introduction of which, coupled with
an appropriate reduction in taxation, is therefore useful for increasing the e¢ ciency of
tobacco control policies.
As for smoking restrictions, we show that they represent an additional useful in-
7As it will become clear later on, in our model, the fact that the optimal tax targets the average
smoker depends on the assumed linear functional forms for health harms with respect to tobacco
consumption. With strictly convex functions, the analysis would be more complex (instead of average
values, the optimal tax would depend on mean-variance indexes of the key parameters) but the essence
of the results would not change. The issue of the functional specication for health costs is briey
discussed in K½oszegi (2005, p. 78).
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strument for curbing smoking externalities that are only partially corrected by uniform
taxation, since the latter  by correcting for the average externality  is unable to
account for the di¤erent external costs caused by smokers in di¤erent environments.
However, it is never optimal extending smoking bans to all situations in which tobacco
consumption causes external costs. The optimal degree of (incomplete) regulation im-
poses a ban on smoking where it generates an externality larger than a given threshold,
but no ban where the externality is below it. Note that also smoking bans are second
best policies. On the one hand, they impose zero tobacco consumption where the ex-
ternal costs are relatively large, while it should only be reduced to its e¢ cient positive
level in the rst best allocation. On the other hand, they leave consumption unres-
tricted where the external costs are relatively low, with the result that consumption is
above its e¢ cient level.
Our nal set of results concerns the impact on policy outcomes of the lobbying
activities of tobacco producers, smokers, and non-smokers, organized as pressure groups
aiming at bending tobacco control policies towards their interests. We show that produ-
cers concentrate their lobbying e¤ort mainly on taxation, while lobbying on prevention
policies and regulation appears to be appealing to citizens only. In particular, all inter-
ested parties actively lobby for a¤ecting tobacco taxation, with results that obviously
depend on their relative strengths as lobbying actors. At the same time, the impact of
lobbying on prevention policies and on smoking restrictions depends essentially on the
contrasting preferences of non-smokers and smokers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief survey
of the literature on tobacco taxation, as well as stylized facts supporting our interest
on additional policy instruments. The model is introduced in Section 3. The socially
optimal structure of control policies is derived in Section 4, while the e¤ects of lobbying
are investigated in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Related literature and stylized facts
The pros and cons of tobacco taxation. Most of the available literature focuses exclus-
ively on the role of taxation for regulating tobacco consumption. There are at least
three traditionalarguments that are advocated in favor of tobacco taxation. First, it
constitutes a good source of tax revenue (being a relatively simple levy to administer)
both at the central and at the sub-central levels of government. Second, it represents
5
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a simple way to have smokers paying for the pecuniary externalities they impose on
society, mainly due to the extra health care costs that are necessary to treat smoking
related diseases. Third, taxation is often motivated by the paternalistic view building
on the value of discouraging tobacco consumption, seen as a harmful good that would
otherwise be consumed in excessive quantities by boundedly rationalconsumers. This
paternalistic view has been forcefully criticized by Becker and Murphy (1988) based on
the idea of rational addiction. According to their view, as smoking habits are the result
of optimizing choices by rational agents, there is no need to reduce demand by levying
taxes on tobacco. Among the other arguments against tobacco taxation, a very popu-
lar one holds that its burden is regressive, since cigarettes consumption accounts for a
larger share of the income of poor households. Such taxes are therefore also criticized
on equity grounds.
The more recent literature has both refreshed and challenged the traditional view
just outlined along several dimensions (see, e.g., Gruber and K½oszegi (2008) for a com-
prehensive non-technical survey). First, the premise that smokers may not behave in a
fully rational way has been revived by building on the theory of intertemporal choices
with hyperbolic discounting (on the latter, see, among others, Laibson, 1997). For
instance, the models developed by Gruber and K½oszegi (2004), and by ODonoghue
and Rabin (2006), provide a rigorous underpinning of the role that taxation can play
in correcting time inconsistent choices by the consumers of a harmful good. Second,
some authors (e.g., Gruber and K½oszegi, 2008) reject the pecuniary externality argu-
ment in favor of tobacco taxation. In particular, they hold that the burden on health
care systems to treat smoke-related diseases is approximately of the same magnitude
as the savings on retirement expenditures, since smokers have a shorter life expectation
than non-smokers (see also Crawford et al., 2010, for a critical assessment of the em-
pirical literature about the estimation of the net costs of smoking). Third, Gruber and
K½oszegi (2004) provide another important challenge to the traditional view on tobacco
taxation, by arguing that the taxation of cigarettes consumption may show a burden
prole that is, in welfare terms, progressive. The intuition is simple. In a setting of
time inconsistent behavior, tobacco taxation plays a corrective role by reducing over-
consumption. However, since low income consumers are more sensitive to tax induced
price changes than high income consumers, taxation may turn out to benet more the
low than the high income individuals, hence showing a progressive pattern in terms of
welfare gains.
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Tobacco control policies: empirical evidence. The available empirical evidence for the
USA, summarized in Table 1, shows that non-price control policies are widely used in
addition to taxes as instruments to regulate tobacco consumption.
<Insert Table 1 about here>
The table reports the latest publicly available data on each excise state tax per
pack of cigarettes, on the per capita amount of state tax revenue from cigarette sales,
on the per capita funds allocated for tobacco control programs, on the so called total
Alciati score (measuring the extensiveness of state tobacco control youth access laws),
and on an index of smoke-free air laws (measuring the level of smoking restrictions by
state law).8 Although there is a large heterogeneity among states  both in the extent
and in the mix of the adopted measures  it is evident that policy makers do not rely
exclusively (or even primarily) on taxation to restrict tobacco consumption, but rather
combine a variety of di¤erent instruments. It is therefore important, in a theoretical
perspective, to properly account for these instruments, moving behind a framework
that only focuses on the role of taxes.9
The theoretical analysis we develop in the paper considers explicitly also the role of
lobbying and of its e¤ects on the policy interventions regulating tobacco consumption.
This is again motivated on empirical grounds. Table 2 shows the importance of lobbying
by tobacco industry related lobbies in the U.S.A., by reporting their total contributions
to candidates and committees at the federal, state and local level over the period 2004-
2014. For the sake of comparison, the table also reports the contributions of two other
8Although the latest available data on state tax revenue (REV) are for scal year 2013, in Table
1 we report the 2011 data in order to make a consistent comparison with the latest available data
on control programs (TCP). Note also that the table reports only empirical observations on tobacco
control policies undertaken by the U.S. States, although similar policies are implemented also at the
federal and at the local levels of government. For instance, in addition to state taxes, there is a Federal
excise tax of $1.01 per pack (since April 1, 2009) and, in some states, also a tax levied at the county
and/or city levels. Note that, as largely expected, tobacco-producers states have both lower taxation
and a lower reliance on other control policies.
9Similar evidence is available for the European Union, where data on ex-
cise duties on tobacco are periodically released by the European Commission
(http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/excise_duties/index_en.htm). The evolution
of the European legislation on smoking bans is illustrated by the European Public Health Alliance
(EPHA, http://www.epha.org/a/1941).
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sectors subject to excise taxation, the oil and gas sector and the alcoholic beverage
sector. Overall, the contributions of the tobacco sector are similar in size to those of
the alcoholic beverage sector, while those of the oil and gas sector are twice as big. The
table also reports the excise tax revenues at the federal, state and local level for the
three sectors over the period 2004-2011. The reported gures show that the share of
political contributions to tax revenue is equal to .071% of tax revenue in the tobacco
sector, in between the .053% for the oil and gas sector and the .145% for alcoholic
beverages.
<Insert Table 2 about here>
While it is relatively easy to nd data on campaign contributions of lobby groups
linked to the tobacco industry, it is way more di¢ cult to obtain information on pressure
groups (such as non-prot or voluntary citizensorganizations) that lobby for stricter
taxation and regulation policies.10 A specic instance in which it is possible to explicitly
compare the e¤orts made by lobbies having opposite views on tobacco control policies
is to look at the donations made by various groups to inuence the outcome of ballot
measures on tobacco related issues (in the 24 states where ballot measures are allowed).
Table 3 shows the contributions raised by lobby groups that opposed or favored ballot
measures in the U.S. states over the period 20022012.11
<Insert Table 3 about here>
Two considerations are worth making. First, it emerges that not only tobacco
producers and manufacturers are active in lobbying, but that also anti-tobacco interest
groups are able to pledge a considerable amount of nancial resources to voice their
concerns. Second, it appears that lobbying is quantitatively more important when
10The reason is that in many cases these organizations lobby to achieve multiple goals, and it may be
di¢ cult to disentangle the actual contributions pledged towards a specic issue. For instance, organiz-
ations such as the American Cancer Society lobby both for stricter regulation on tobacco consumption
and for increased cancer prevention programs funding that is not necessarily related to smoking habits.
11Obviously, lobbying needs not occur at the state level only. Therefore, the gures in Table 3 
not accounting for lobbying at the federal or local level  are likely to understate the extent of the
phenomenon.
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ballot measures deal mainly or exclusively with changes in tax rates rather than on
control policies. This is particularly interesting as it is consistent with a nding of our
theoretical model highlighting that lobbying impacts mainly on tobacco taxation, while
it bears a modest impact on prevention programs and on smoking restrictions.
3 The model
Our theoretical framework extends those by ODonoghue and Rabin (2005, 2006) and
K½oszegi (2005), in which taxation is the only policy instrument for controlling tobacco
consumption, by adding prevention policies and free-air legislation to the set of available
policy tools. This broadening of the analysis requires an appropriate characterization
of preferences for smoking, which is provided in Section 3.1. Section 3.2 derives the
market equilibrium. Finally, the representation of individual and aggregate surplus in
Section 3.3 opens the way to the normative analysis that is developed in Section 4.
3.1 The consumption sector
We consider a population divided into two, exogenously given, groups: that of smokers,
of mass m 2 (0; 1), and that of non-smokers, of mass 1 m.
Modeling preferences for smoking requires recognizing that cigarettes consumption
does not entail decreasing marginal utility on temporally subsequent units of consump-
tion. Instead, the pleasureenjoyed from smoking cigarettes follows a random process
on the time line. In fact, a smoker may enjoy greater pleasure from the (n + 1)-th
than from the n-th cigarette of the day, depending on a variety of circumstances. For
instance, smoking after lunch may be more enjoyable than smoking in the morning
while commuting to work.
The presence of smoking restrictions in the form of free air laws and regulations
also plays a role in a¤ecting the pleasure derived from smoking a cigarette. In this re-
spect, the crucial feature is that a smoking restriction is not equivalent to consumption
rationing. Consider, for instance, a smoking ban in restaurants. The fact that smoking
is forbidden within a restaurant premises does not imply a ceiling on cigarettes con-
sumption. Clearly, a smoker can always opt for increasing the number of cigarettes
consumed before and/or after the meal, or she can have a break during the meal going
outside the restaurant to smoke. Therefore, what is relevant about smoking restrictions
are the costs they impose on smokers in terms of reduced pleasure from smoking. In
9
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the example, it is likely that a smoker would take greater pleasure from smoking inside
the restaurant than having to do it outside.
We formalize these ideas by building a model in which smokers consume two types
of goods: a harmful good x (i.e., cigarettes) and a standardconsumption good z. Non-
smokers consume only good z. Each unit of good z provides a constant gross surplus to
consumers, the size of which is normalized to one. As for the other good, let s be the
gross surplus (i.e., the immediate pleasure) of consuming one unit of x (i.e., smoking a
cigarette) whenever smoking occurs in a location not subject to smoking restrictions.
In any given period of time, s is assumed to be uniformly distributed on the closed
interval [0; 1=1], with 1 > 0. Therefore, the inverse of the parameter 1 captures the
intensityof smoking preferences, as 1=1 represents the maximum level of pleasure
that an individual can enjoy from smoking a cigarette. If, instead, tobacco consumption
occurs in a location that is subject to a smoking ban, it is assumed that gross surplus
is uniformly distributed on the closed interval [ ; 1=1   ], where 0 <  < 1=1.
The parameter  represents the cost, in terms of forgone pleasure, that is incurred by
complying with the smoking ban (for instance, smoking outside the restaurant), which
we assume for simplicity to be enforced perfectly and at no cost. We further denote
with 0 > 0 the volumeof tobacco consumption (see Footnote 14 below).
We assume that an exogenous share  2 (0; 1) of consumption occurs in locations
that could be subject to smoking restrictions due to the negative externalities imposed
on other individuals by smokers (that we will formally dene in Section 3.3). The
actual restriction on consumption in these locations is denoted by a parameter r 2
[0; 1], capturing the degree of regulation. Hence, overall, consumption in unrestricted
locations is a share 1   r of total consumption, while that in restricted locations is
given by r.
Present smoking provokes future harm for health, which is assumed to take a lin-
ear form. More precisely, the present value of future harm for each unit of current
consumption is assumed being equal to , where the parameter   0 represents the
present value of health harm, and the hyperbolic-discounting parameter  2 [0; 1] cap-
tures (in a reduced form) the degree of time inconsistency, or of lack of self-control, in
consumer behavior;12  < 1 implies overconsumption with respect to its e¢ cient level,
12The assumption that smokers may lack self control (i.e.,  < 1) while they are correctly informed
about the true risks due to tobacco use (i.e., the value of ) is consistent with recent evidence reported
by Khwaya et al. (2009). Smokerstime preferences, time discounting, and abilities to plan, are instead
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whereas  = 1 implies fully rational behavior.
Di¤erently from ODonoghue and Rabin (2006) and K½oszegi (2005), who take it
as exogenously given, we assume that the parameter  is endogenously determined by
the variable , representing a policy instrument that the regulator can use to a¤ect the
consumption of the harmful good. For instance, if the government launches a campaign
against tobacco use, the degree of smokersself-control in taking consumption decisions
may increase, an outcome that is reected in higher levels of . In particular, we assume
that () = b+ k, where the parameter b 2 [0; 1] represents the component of  that
is independent of , whereas the parameter k  0 captures the sensitivity of individual
self consciousness to the policy instrument .
Each individual (either a smoker, or a non-smoker) is endowed with an exogenously
given income I and receives a lump sum transfer ` from the government, equal for all
individuals, which is dened in Eq. (17) below. Good z is taken to be the numeraire
and p denotes the unit market price of good x. Both ` and p are taken as given by the
consumer. Finally, we assume that in any given period of time the total gross surplus
from smoking is equal to the sum of the gross surpluses from the various consumption
units.
Under the assumptions above, a smoker aiming at maximizing her total net surplus
will eventually consume only those units of x for which she derives a gross surplus s
that is larger than or equal to p+ , and use the residual income to buy good z. As
we show in Appendix A.1, this is equivalent to maximize the utility function
u(xu; xr; z) = (1  r)vu(xu) + rvr(xr)  ()x+ z, (1)
subject to the budget constraint
z  I + `  px, (2)
where
vu(xu) =
1
1

1  x
u
20

xu, vr(xr) =
1
1

1  1  
xr
20

xr,
x = (1  r)xu + rxr, () = b+ k,
and xu, xr denote consumption in unrestricted and restricted locations, respectively.
The smokerspopulation is composed of a continuum of heterogeneous individuals,
each one characterized by a vector  = (0; 1; ; b; k; ) of individualsattributes. The
critically assessed in Khwaya et al. (2007a, 2007b).
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cumulative distribution of types is F () and we assume that all individual attributes
belonging to  are independently distributed.13 We denote with y  EF [y] the expec-
ted value of the variable y, with y element of . Notice that y is the per capita value
of y for the group of smokers. Since the latter group has mass m, the per capita value
of y for the entire population (smokers and non-smokers) is equal to my, where we let
y = 0 for non-smokers without loss of generality. Note nally that we assume that  is
single valued; i.e., it takes the same value for all smokers.
3.2 Market equilibrium
From the rst order conditions for maximizing Eq. (1), subject to Eq. (2), we obtain
the individual demands for cigarettes in unrestricted and restricted locations
xu(p; ) = 0   01(() + p), xr(p; ) = 0   01(() +  + p), (3)
respectively, where the arguments of the vector  are dropped to simplify notation
whenever possible.14 Note that xu(p; ) > xr(p; ). Total individual demand is equal
to
x(p; ; r) = 0   01(() + r + p). (4)
Aggregate demand (which is equal to smokersper capita demand) is then equal to
X(p; ; r) = 0   01(() + r + p), () = b+ k,
while the inverse aggregate demand is
p(X; ; r) =
1
1
  ()   r   1
01
X. (5)
For given values of , the aggregate demand X(p; ; r) is dened only for values of p
such that the individual demand xr(p; ) is non-negative for all consumers types. As
we further discuss below, in order to simplify the analysis we rule out the possibility
of corner solutions in which individual demand is zero for some consumers.
Good z is produced in a competitive market, while good x is produced in an oli-
gopolistic market, which is characterized by a xed number, n  1, of quantity-setting
13Note that the model can be solved also when individual attributes are correlated, at the cost,
however, of deriving less clear-cut results.
14The expression for xu(p; ) shows that the parameter 0 represents the amount of cigarettes that
would be consumed in the given period of time by a smoker who is allowed to buy cigarettes at zero
price (p = 0) and who does not internalize future health harms ( = 0).
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identical rms competing à la Cournot. There is a specic (excise) tax at rate t on
cigarettes consumption, levied on producers. Production costs are linear, with constant
marginal costs, c > 0, equal to average costs.
Firm j maximizes its prot function with respect to the quantity it produces, xj ,
taking as given the quantities produced by the other rms; i.e.
max
xj
j = (p(X; ; r)  c  t)xj , where X =
nX
i=1
xi. (6)
By taking the rst order condition of Problem (6) with respect to xj , we obtain15
1
1
  ()   r   c  t  1
01
0@X
i6=j
xi + 2xj
1A = 0, j = 1; : : : ; n: (7)
Summing Eq. (7) over j = 1; : : : ; n, we have
n

1
1
  ()   r   c  t

  1
01
((n  1)X + 2X) = 0.
From the latter equation, we then obtain the equilibrium aggregate quantity as a func-
tion of the policy instruments:
X(t; ; r) =
n
1 + n
0
 
1  1
 
() + r + c+ t

. (8)
Since rms are identical, the market equilibrium is symmetric. By substitutingX(t; ; r)
into Eq. (5) and solving for p, we get the equilibrium consumersprice
p(t; ; r) =
n
1 + n
(c+ t) +
1
1 + n

1
1
  ()   r

. (9)
We assume that, for any given triplet (t; ; r) of policy instruments, the elements of
the vector  are such that xr(p; ) > 0 for all types, implying that all individuals
are smokers at all equilibrium prices.16 In turn, this implies a well dened market
equilibrium, with X(t; ; r) > 0 and p(t; ; r) > 0. Notice that aggregate consumption
is decreasing in the policy parameters t,  and r. However, while the tax rate t, by
15Under the given hypotheses (linear demand and linear production costs) the necessary rst order
conditions for prot maximization are also su¢ cient. Moreover, Sterns (1987) market equilibrium
stability condition is also satised.
16This assumption rules out corner solutions in which the consumption of the harmful good is zero for
some potential smokers. While it is possible to allow for an endogenous partition of smokers into active
and non-activetobacco consumers, the extension would complicate the analysis without adding much
to the main message of the paper.
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augmenting rmsmarginal costs, increases the consumersprice, anti-tobacco policies
 and smoking restrictions r decrease it because they reduce the aggregate demand
without imposing a direct cost on producers.
By substituting p from Eq. (9) into Eq. (4) we get individual total consumption,
x(t; ; r) = 0   01(() + r + p(t; ; r)), (10)
as a function of the policy parameters and of individual type. It is then immediate to
see that:
@x
@t
=
@x
@p
@p
@t
=   n
1 + n
01 < 0, (11)
@x
@
=
@x
@p
@p
@
+
@x
@
=

1
1 + n
k   k

01 Q 0 i¤  R
k
k

(1 + n)
, (12)
@x
@r
=
@x
@p
@p
@r
+
@x
@r
= 

1
1 + n
   

01 Q 0 i¤  R

1 + n
. (13)
Proposition 1 follows immediately from Eqs. (11) (13).
Proposition 1 Taxation reduces individual consumption of all types. Prevention policies
reduce (increase) consumption for those types with harm  greater (smaller) than
k
k

(1+n) . Smoking restrictions reduce (increase) consumption for those types experi-
encing a cost  for complying with the regulatory restriction greater (smaller) than

1+n .
Taxation has the obvious e¤ect of increasing consumersprice, which reduces the con-
sumption of all types. The intuition behind the other results is also simple. An increase
in  reduces aggregate demand and therefore the equilibrium price. However, for those
smokers with a low  the reduction in price causes an increase in demand that outweighs
the reduction due to a higher . Similarly, for the individuals for whom complying with
a regulatory ban is not particularly costly, the increase in demand caused by the re-
duction in price induced by higher regulation more than compensates the reduction of
demand directly associated to it. Note that under perfect competition only the direct
e¤ect on individual demands is present in Eqs. (12) and (13), since  and r do not
impact on the equilibrium price p, hence reducing consumption x for all types.
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Observe nally that the impact of  and r is isomorphic to that of t; i.e.
@X
@t
= EF

@x
@t

=   n
1 + n
01 < 0, (14)
@X
@
= EF

@x
@

= k
@X
@t
< 0, (15)
@X
@r
= EF

@x
@r

= 
@X
@t
< 0, (16)
which is a useful property of the impact of policy instruments on the aggregate tobacco
consumption.
3.3 Individual and aggregate welfare
We assume, as it is standard in the literature, that the revenue raised by taxing tobacco
consumption, tX(t; ; r), net of the expenditures for nancing prevention policies,
(=2)2 with   0, is given back to consumers (both smokers and non-smokers) in a
lump sum form. Hence, for the entire population, the transfer in per capita terms is
equal to
`(t; ; r) = m

tX(t; ; r)  
2
2

. (17)
Note that we abstract from the administrative costs of taxation, again as it is
standard in the literature on optimal taxation. Furthermore, we assume that there are
no direct costs associated to the enforcement of smoking restrictions.
Using Eqs. (1) and (2), the net surplus of a smoker can be dened as
w = (1  r)vu(xu) + rvr(xr)  x   px + `  m  + I, (18)
in which we suppress the arguments t,  and r from all the starredequilibrium vari-
ables to simplify the notation. Note that the fullharm, x, enters the denition of
individual welfare in Eq. (18) in place of its hyperbolically discounted measure, x,
which instead enters the utility function in Eq. (1). Consistently with K½oszegi (2005),
Eq. (1) represents smokersutility with smoking occurring in the present, under the
pressure for immediate gratication, and harm in the future. Instead, Eq. (18) repres-
ents the utility with smoking and harm occurring both in the future. By the theory of
hyperbolic discounting (Laibson, 1997), individuals do not bias their choices in favor of
immediate gratication when consumption is planned in the future, since the marginal
rate of substitution between future pleasure from smoking and future health harm is
15
15
the correct one. However, at the time when consumption actually occurs, smokers take
distorted choices, since the marginal rate of substitution between current pleasure from
smoking and future health harm is biased in favor of immediate gratication. Hence,
while actual consumerschoices are described by the utility function (1), their welfare
can be measured through the utility function (18), which expresses the preferences of
a fully self-controlled (perfectly time consistent) individual.
Another crucial element a¤ecting individual welfare is the externality   that smokers
impose on other individuals (for instance, in the form of health harm arising from
second-hand smoke), which is dened in aggregate terms as
  = (r) (1  r)Xu, (r) = 0 (1  r) , (19)
where 0 > 0 and X
u = 0 01(()+p) is obtained by aggregating the individual
demands xu(p; ), dened in Eq. (3), evaluated at the equilibrium price p. Note that,
according to Eq. (18), each smoker uniformly imposes an externality to all other
individuals, smokers and non-smokers. In our linear framework, it is easy to see that
the same aggregate implications would emerge were the externality to a¤ect di¤erently
di¤erent individuals.
The policy instruments impact on the externality as follows:
@ 
@t
= (1  r)@X
u
@p
@p
@t
< 0, (20)
@ 
@
=  (1  r)01

@
@
 +
@p
@

< 0, (21)
@ 
@r
= (1  r)@X
u
@p
@p
@r
  

   (1  r)@
@r

Xu Q 0. (22)
Higher taxation and larger prevention programs, by reducing aggregate tobacco
consumption, reduce the level of the aggregate externality. Instead, stricter smoking
restrictions have two contrasting e¤ects on the externality. On the one hand, by widen-
ing the set of locations in which smoking is not allowed, they reduce the level of external
costs (the second addendum in Eq. 22); on the other hand, by lowering the price of
cigarettes, they stimulate tobacco consumption in the locations that are not subject
to the smoking ban, which in turn increases external costs (the rst addendum in Eq.
22).
Remark. Several assumptions underline the formulation of the externality dened
in Eq. (19). The locations in which smoking causes a damage to other individuals
are ranked, in decreasing order, according to the level of externalities they give rise
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to. On the unit line, we let the linearly decreasing function ~(L) = 20 (1  L) to
represent the externality per unit of tobacco consumption on the ordered locations
L 2 [0; 1]. The highest level of the externality is 20, at location L = 0; the lowest
is zero, at location L = 1. We further assume that tobacco consumption is uniformly
distributed on locations L 2 [0; 1] and that the policy instrument r 2 [0; 1], represent-
ing smoking restrictions, maps one-to-one on the ordered set of locations. Therefore,
for any given degree r of smoking restrictions, the externalities are neutralized in all
locations L 2 [0; r] in which smoking is forbidden (the locations with relatively large
externalities), whereas they are allowed in the remaining locations L 2 (r; 1] (with
relatively small externalities). The function (r) shown in Eq. (19) then represents
the average externality generated by each unit of consumption in the unregulated loca-
tions; i.e., (r) = (1  r) 1 R 1r ~(L) dL. Finally, recalling that  represents the exogen-
ous share of total tobacco consumption that occurs in locations where externalities are
produced in case of smoking, and that Xu is aggregate consumption in unrestricted
locations, we see that  (1  r)Xu is equal to aggregate consumption in the unreg-
ulated externality-generating locations. The aggregate externality   is then equal
to aggregate consumption  (1  r)Xu times the average externality (r) per unit of
consumption.
By substituting ` from Eq. (17), adding and subtracting (p  c  t)x, and adding
and subtracting x, Eq. (18) can be written as
w = u (1 )x+(p c)x m +t(mX x) (p c t)x m
2
2+I, (23)
where
u = (1  r)vu(xu) + rvr(xr)  x   px. (24)
Note that, by standard envelope arguments, we have that
@u
@t
=  x@p

@t
, (25)
@u
@
=  

k +
@p
@

x, (26)
@u
@r
=  x@p

@r
   [vu(xu)  vr(xr)] . (27)
As for non-smokers, they devote all their income, I + `, to the consumption of
good z, with utility linearly increasing in z with unit slope. Hence, individual welfare
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is equal to
~w = `  m  + I = m

tX   
2
2    

+ I. (28)
To compute social welfare, we adopt the Utilitarian criterion. Therefore, by aggreg-
ating the individual welfare levels shown in Eqs. (23) and (28), the per capita welfare
level for the entire population is equal to
mEF [w
] + (1 m) ~w =
= m

EF [u
   (1  )x + (p   c)x]        
2
2

+ I, (29)
where the aggregate equilibrium prots, , are equal to
 = (p   c  t)X. (30)
By adding per capita prots, m, to per capita welfare (i.e., net surplus) dened
in Eq. (29), the per capita surplus of the economy is dened as17

 = m

EF [u
   (1  )x + (p   c)x]      
2
2

+ I. (31)
4 E¢ cient policies
We assume that a benevolent policy maker sets the policy instruments with the aim of
maximizing the per capita surplus dened in Eq. (31). Note that such social objective
function implies that optimality is dened in terms of e¢ ciency, so that distributional is-
sues (between heterogeneous smokers, between smokers and non-smokers, and between
consumers and prot earners) are ignored. The objective function (31) also shows that
the e¢ cient policy is independent of the proportion, m, of smokers in the total popu-
lation. The relative weight of smokers and non-smokers can instead play a role when
public policy is distorted by the lobbying activities of special interest groups, as we
show in Section 5.
17Since aggregate rmsprots, , are part of the surplus of the economy, and since prots in per
capita terms, m, are a negative component of consumerssurplus in per capita terms, in order to
obtain the aggregate surplus of the economy in per capita terms we need to add per capita prots m
to Eq. (29). Assuming instead that prots are entirely distributed to consumers has no implications
for the optimal policies derived in Section 4, as also in that case we would obtain exactly Eq. (31) as
the objective function. However, for the analysis of lobbying in Section 5, it seems more appropriate
to assume that prots are entirely retained by rms, so that their incentives to lobby are not perfectly
aligned to those of consumers (smokers and non-smokers).
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Instead of seeking the solution to the policy problem simultaneously for the three in-
struments, it is instructive to consider them separately, rst characterizing the optimal
tax rate t for given values of the other instruments, then turning to the determination
of the prevention policies , and nally focusing on smoking restrictions r.
4.1 Taxation
By di¤erentiating Eq. (31) with respect to t, we get
1
m
@

@t
= EF

@u
@t
  (1  ) @x

@t
+ x
@p
@t
+ (p   c)@x

@t

  @ 

@t
. (32)
By rewriting Eq. (20) as
@ 
@t
=   n
1 + n
010(1  r)2 = 0(1  r)2
@X
@t
, (33)
using Eq. (25) to simplify the expression in the expectation operator, and then taking
the expectation, Eq. (32) can be written as
1
m
@

@t
=   (1  )   (p   c) + 0(1  r)2 @X@t . (34)
Since, using Eq. (9), we have that
p   c = n
1 + n
t+
1
1 + n

1
1
     r   c

,
and given that m > 0 and @X=@t < 0, the rst order necessary condition for the
optimal tax rate can be written as
(1  )   n
1 + n
t  1
1 + n

1
1
     r   c

+ 0(1  r)2 = 0. (35)
By solving (35) for t, we can immediately state the following proposition.
Proposition 2 For given  and r, the optimal tax rate is equal to
t(; r) = (1  ()) + 0(1  r)2  
1
n
	(r), (36)
where
	(r) =
1
1
     r   0(1  r)2   c > 0. (37)
t(:) is decreasing in b and k, and increasing in , 0, , n, 1 and . Furthermore, it
is decreasing in , while an increase in r has an ambiguous e¤ect on t(:).
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Eq. (36) is composed of three terms. The rst two are both positive and represent
the Pigouvian components of the optimal tax rate. While the rst term is equal to
the average harm that consumers do not internalize because of lack of self-control, the
second term is equal to the average externality per unit of consumption in locations
not subject to smoking restrictions. Note that while an increase in  reduces the rst
component of the Pigouvian tax, an increase in r reduces its second component.
The third term of Eq. (36) is instead negative, provided that Inequality (37) holds
true. To see the meaning of the latter condition, notice rst that by substituting
t(; r) from Eq. (36) into Eq. (8), we immediately see that X(t(; r); ; r) > 0
if and only if Inequality (37) is satised. That is, Condition (37) is a necessary and
su¢ cient condition for having a positive level of aggregate consumption at the optimal
tax policy t(; r). The economic interpretation of the inequality is simple. For the
average smoker, the maximum level of pleasure from smoking, 1=1, has to exceed
the sum of the average marginal health harm, , the marginal cost of complying with
smoking restrictions in regulated locations, r, the marginal externality generated
by smoking in unregulated locations, 0(1   r)2, and the marginal cost of cigarettes
production, c. In other words, if 	(r) > 0, then a positive level of tobacco consumption
is e¢ cient for the average smoker. The role of the third term of the optimal tax rate in
Eq. (36) is then that of correcting for market power, since oligopoly pricing is above
marginal cost. It is immediate to see that this term vanishes for n!1, as the market
approaches perfect competition . Note also that direct regulation r bears an ambiguous
impact on this third component of the optimal tax rate.
Summing up, Eq. (36) shows that in general both a tax and a subsidy could
be optimal. In practice, to the extent that internalities and externalities are more
important than market imperfections, the optimal tax rate is expected to be positive.
4.2 Prevention policies
As for prevention policies, by di¤erentiating Eq. (31) with respect to , we obtain
1
m
@

@
= EF

@u
@
  (1  ) @x

@
+

k +
@p
@

x + (p   c)@x

@

 @ 

@
 . (38)
Using Eq. (26) and the fact that Eq. (21) can be written as
@ 
@
= k
@ 
@t
= k0(1  r)2
@X
@t
, (39)
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Eq. (38) can be expressed as
1
m
@

@
=  EF

[(1  )   (p   c)] @x

@

  k0(1  r)2
@X
@t
  . (40)
By taking the expectation, using Eqs. (12), (15), and (34), the derivative in Eq. (40)
can be written as
1
m
@

@
=  cov

(1  ); @x

@

+ k
1
m
@

@t
  . (41)
With t optimally set, the third term of the above derivative is zero. Recalling that
 = b+ k and using Eq. (12), the covariance term in Eq. (41) is equal to
 cov

(1  ); @x

@

= 01

(1  b)k var()   var(k) . (42)
Hence, with t optimally set, the rst order necessary condition for the optimal level of
prevention policies can be written as
1
m
@

@

t=t(;r)
= 01

(1  b)k var()   var(k)   = 0. (43)
By solving Eq. (43) for , we get the following result.
Proposition 3 With t = t(; r), the optimal level of prevention policies is given by
 =
(1  b)k var()
=(01) + var(k)
, (44)
where var(k) = k2 var()+2 var(k)+var(k) var().  is decreasing in b, , , var(k),
and increasing in var(), 0, 1. An increase in k has an ambiguous impact on 
.
Since b < 1 and k > 0, Eq. (44) shows that  > 0 if and only if var() > 0, that is if
and only if di¤erent individuals su¤er di¤erent health harms from smoking. For given
var() > 0, the higher is the marginal cost  of the policy , the lower is its optimal
level . Notice also that  is a¤ected neither by market structure (i.e., by n), nor by
the average level of the externality, , nor by the degree of smoking restrictions, r.
That the optimal tax rate t(; r) is an increasing function of the average health
harm, , while the optimal control policy  is increasing in its variance, var(), is
easily explained by looking at the partial derivatives (11) and (12), representing the
impact of t and  on individual consumption, respectively. While @x=@ is a decreasing
function of , @x=@t is independent of it. Moreover, in expected terms, EF [@x=@] =
k EF [@x
=@t]. The latter equation implies that t and  are equivalent instruments
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for targeting the average level of the internality, (1  ). Therefore, since  is costly
(provided that  > 0) whereas t is costless, only the latter instrument is used to
correct for the average level of the internality. The policy  then turns out to be a
useful additional instrument insofar individual health harms have a positive variance,
since  bears a di¤erent impact on individual tobacco demands for di¤erent values of
.
Notice also that  is a decreasing function of var(k), whereas the impact of k is
undecided. A higher var(k) implies that policy  is less accurate in targeting the various
types of smokers, since prevention programs impact di¤erently on di¤erent smokers,
and therefore its optimal level  is lower. A higher k, instead, implies that policy 
is on average more e¤ective in discouraging tobacco overconsumption, and therefore it
lowers its optimal level . However, a higher k also increases var(k) and this tends
to reduce . Eq. (44) also shows that  is a decreasing function of b, the average
level of the exogenous component of .
By substituting for  from Eq. (44) into t(; r) shown in Eq. (36), we get the
optimal tax rate t(; r) as a function of the policy instrument r. It is immediate to
see that 1  () = 1 b  k > 0, which means that the rst term of the optimal tax
rate, i.e., the one correcting for time inconsistent smoking behavior, is always positive
when  is optimally set.18 This further claries the interpretation of Propositions 2
and 3. In particular, it is instructive to consider the special case in which  is costless
( = 0), with var(k) = 0 and var() > 0. From Eqs. (36) and (44) we then see
that  = (1   b)=k, which implies that the rst term of t(; r) is zero. That is,
each instrument targets a di¤erent source of market failure: while taxation corrects
for the consumption externality and oligopoly pricing, prevention programs correct for
the consumption internality. Note that policy  is always zero at the optimum when
var() = 0 and  > 0, because in this case taxation, which is costless, is a su¢ cient
instrument to target all sources of market failure.
Finally, before turning to the determination of the level of smoking restrictions r,
we notice that the optimal policies,  and t(; r), represent the unique maximum of
the policy problem, since the welfare function (31) is a strictly concave function of the
variables (t; )  as shown in Appendix A.2.
18Clearly, that () = b + k < 1 does not imply that () = b + k < 1 for all (b; k). That
is, for some smokers, it could be that () > 1, which means that the policy  causes tobacco
underconsumption.
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4.3 Smoking restrictions
We study the choice of the optimal level of smoking restrictions by focusing on the rst
order partial derivative of the objective function (31) with respect to r; i.e.,
1
m
@

@r
= EF

@u
@r
  (1  ) @x

@r
+ x
@p
@r
+ (p   c)@x

@r

  @ 

@r
. (45)
Using Eqs. (27), (13), (16), (34), and the fact that Eq. (22) can be written as
@ 
@r
= 
@ 
@t
  1 + n
n

@ 
@t
  20(1  r)Xu, (46)
the derivative in Eq. (45) can be expressed as
1
m
@

@r
=  EF [vu(xu)  vr(xr)]+ 1
m
@

@t
+
1 + n
n

@ 
@t
+20(1 r)Xu. (47)
With t optimally set, the second term of the above derivative is zero. The remaining
terms of Eq. (47) can conveniently be interpreted in terms of the marginal costs and
marginal benets involved in the optimal choice of r.
Given that xu   xr = 01 > 0 by Eq. (3), from the denition of the utility
function given in Eq. (1), we can compute the expected value of the rst term in Eq.
(47) as being equal to
 EF [vu(xu)  vr(xr)] =  EF

0

1  1
2

=
=  0

   1
2
1(var() +

2
)

< 0, (48)
which is strictly negative for  > 0, since the assumption that xr = 0(1   1)  
01( + p
) > 0 implies 1  1 > 0 and therefore also 1  1=2 > 0, for all (1; ).
The expressions shown in Eq. (48) represent the average marginal welfare cost (in terms
of reduced hedonic pleasure for complying with smoking restrictions) that smokers bear
when, by increasing r, smoking is forbidden in more locations. Note that this marginal
welfare cost is independent of r and of the other policy instruments, t and .
Using Eq. (20), the third term of Eq. (47) can be written as
1 + n
n

@ 
@t
=  0102(1  r)2  0. (49)
This term represents the welfare cost due to the fact that an increase in r, by lowering
the equilibrium price p, tends to increase tobacco consumption and therefore also the
externality   in unrestricted locations.
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Overall, the marginal costs involved in the choice of r are dened by (minus) the
sum of the terms in Eqs. (48) and (49):
MC(r) = 010
2(1  r)2 + 0

   1
2
1(var() +

2
)

. (50)
The marginal benets of increasing r are instead dened by the fourth term in
Eq. (47), which accounts for the benets of stricter regulation in terms of externality
abatement. By substituting for the optimal tax rate t(; r) dened in Eq. (36) into
Xu, we have that marginal benets are equal to
MB(r) = 20(1  r) Xujt=t(;r) , (51)
where
Xujt=t(;r) = 0   01

c+  +
n
1 + n
0(1  r)2

. (52)
Note that the marginal benets of regulation r, which are evaluated with taxation set at
its optimal level t(; r), do not depend on the level of prevention policies . Notice also
that, with t optimally set, the marginal benets of stricter regulation do not include
any welfare gain from health harm abatement. The reason is that, as we have shown
above, taxation is a su¢ cient instrument to target the average health harm per unit
of tobacco consumption. No additional gains can be obtained by means of regulation,
once taxation is optimally set. Regulation is instead useful to complement taxation in
targeting the externality. The problem with taxation is that it is an imperfect instru-
ment for externality abatement, since it reduces consumption both in the externality
and in the non-externality generating locations. Regulation, instead, targets tobacco
consumption in the externality generating locations only.
By combining Eqs. (50) and (51), the partial derivative of aggregate surplus with
respect to the level of smoking restrictions r, with t optimally set, can be expressed as
1
m
@

@r

t=t(;r)
= MB(r) MC(r). (53)
The following lemma (the proof of which is in Appendix A.3) illustrates the properties
of the marginal benets and cost functions MB(r) and MC(r).
Lemma 1 For 0 > 0, the marginal benets function (51) is a strictly concave function
of r, with MB(0) > 0, MB(1) = 0. For 0 > 0,  > 0, the marginal costs function (50)
is a strictly convex, monotonically decreasing, function of r, with MC(0) > MC(1) > 0.
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Figure 1: Proof of Proposition 4
The existence of an optimal level of r is characterized in the following proposition,
the proof of which is useful in illustrating the logic underlying the use of smoking
restrictions.
Proposition 4 For t = t(; r), there always exists an optimal level r of smoking
restrictions, with r 2 [0; 1), that maximizes the surplus function (31).
Proof. Recall that, by Lemma 1, (i)MB(r) is strictly concave, (ii)MC(r) is strictly
convex, monotonically decreasing, (iii) MB(0) R MC(0), with MB(0) > 0, MC(0) > 0,
(iv) MC(1) > MB(1) = 0. Given these properties, for any given specication of the
relevant parameters, either one of the following outcomes occurs. See panels (a)(d) in
Figure 1 for an illustration.
(a) If MB(r) < MC(r) for all r 2 [0; 1], then there exists a unique maximum for
r = 0.
(b) If MB(r) = MC(r) for r = r0 2 (0; 1) and MB(r) < MC(r) for all r 2 [0; r0) [
(r0; 1], then there exists a unique maximum for r = 0.
(c) If (i) MB(r) = MC(r) for r = fr1; r2g, 0 < r1 < r2 < 1, (ii) MB(r) < MC(r)
for all r 2 [0; r1) [ (r2; 1], (iii) MB(r) > MC(r) for all r 2 (r1; r2), then there exist two
local maxima, one for r = 0 and one for r = r2 2 (0; 1).
(d) If MB(0)  MC(0), then there exists a unique r0 2 (0; 1) such that MB(r) =
MC(r) for r = r0, MB(r) > MC(r) for all r 2 (0; r0) and MB(r) < MC(r) for all
r 2 (r0; 1]. Therefore there exists a unique maximum for r = r0 2 (0; 1).
The proposition shows that it is optimal to set a positive degree of regulation
whenever the ensuing benets in terms of externality abatement are, on average, suf-
ciently higher than the costs imposed, on average, on smokers to comply with the
ban. In these cases, as already noted, (incomplete) regulation usefully complements
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0 1
 var()  0  n
MC(r) " "# " # " "    
MB(r) " #     "# "# # #
r 2 (0; 1) "# "# # " "# "# # #
Table 1: Optimal regulation: comparative statics.
taxation by banning tobacco use only where it causes external costs that are relatively
large. This means, however, that the smoking bans discussed here are only able to
achieve second best allocations, as they impose zero consumption in restricted locations
(where the externalities are relatively large) and free consumption in the unrestricted
ones (where the external costs are relatively small), rather than reducing consumption
to its rst-best level given the magnitude of external costs.
The factors impacting on the marginal costs and benets functions (50) and (51)
are summarized in Table 1. Limiting the analysis to the case in which the optimal
degree of regulation r belongs to an interior point of its feasible range, Table 1 shows
that an increase in the average cost  su¤ered by smokers for complying with smoking
bans  by increasing the marginal costs of regulation  reduces its optimal level,
whereas an increase in their variance var() has the opposite e¤ect. Recalling from
Proposition 2 that t(; r) is increasing in , we then see that while an increase in 
calls for weaker regulation and higher taxation at the optimum, an increase in var()
calls for stricter regulation without a¤ecting the optimal tax. By reducing the marginal
benets of regulation, an increase in the average health harm  reduces the optimal
degree of regulation; the reason is that higher health harms are already optimally
handled with higher taxation, so that the reduction in tobacco consumption allows for
weaker regulation. A similar outcome emerges as the market becomes more competitive,
since an increase in the number n of tobacco producers calls for higher taxation and
weaker regulation at the optimum. The parameters 0, 1,  and 0 bear instead an
ambiguous impact on r, since they a¤ect both the marginal costs and benets in ways
that may push r towards opposite directions. Which of the e¤ects prevails depends
on the specic parameters constellation considered. Notice nally that the marginal
costs and benets of r are independent of b, k, var(), var(k) and . These parameters,
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which are relevant in the determination of the optimal tax and prevention policies,
are irrelevant in the determination of the optimal degree of smoking restrictions. The
following proposition summarizes the results on the comparative statics of the optimal
degree of regulation illustrated in Table 1.19
Proposition 5 If r 2 (0; 1), then r is increasing in var() and decreasing in , 
and n. An increase in 0, 1,  or 0 has an ambiguous impact on r
.
4.4 The e¢ cient set of policies
The results on the characterization of e¢ cient policy instruments derived in Proposi-
tions 2, 3 and 4 are summarized in Proposition 6.
Proposition 6 A benevolent policy maker maximizing the aggregate surplus dened in
Eq. (31) sets the policy instruments t, , and r such that:
 the optimal level of prevention policy, , is dened in Eq. (44);
 the optimal level of smoking restrictions, r, is either r = 0 or r 2 (0; 1). Full
regulation, i.e., r = 1, is never optimal.
 the optimal tax rate is t(; r), with t(; r) dened in Eq. (36).
In the same way, Table 2 summarizes the comparative statics results concerning the
socially optimal set of policy instruments derived in Propositions 2, 3 and 5. Note
that some of the model parameters a¤ect the optimal tax rate both directly, since they
enter the expression for t(; r) dened in Eq. (36), and indirectly, since they a¤ect the
optimal levels of prevention policies  and regulation r, which in turn a¤ect the tax
rate t. While all direct e¤ects are unambiguous, the impact of some parameters on
the optimal tax rate can be either positive or negative because of the indirect e¤ects.
For instance, an increase in b directly reduces the optimal tax rate but, since it also
reduces the optimal level of prevention policies, it indirectly increases t.
19The results in Proposition 5 and Table 1 follow immediately from di¤erentiation of Eqs. (50) and
(51) with respect to the relevant parameters. That @MC(r)=@ = 1   1 > 0 follows from the fact
that xr > 0 for all smokers by assumption (see the discussion following Eq. 48).
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Table 2: Socially e¢ cient policies: comparative statics.
5 Lobbying
In our economy, there are three types of agents that are a¤ected by tobacco control
policies: producers, smokers, and non-smokers. In this section, we examine whether
and how they can inuence public policies by means of organized lobby groups, who are
delegated by individual economic agents the task of pursuing their views (e.g., lobby
rms, or non governmental organizations). We do not model how groups are formed
and how lobbying decisions are taken within them. We simply assume the existence of
a distinct lobby group for each one of the categories involved  producers, smokers,
and non-smokers  and endow them with a well dened objective function, obtained
by aggregation of the payo¤ functions of its members.20
We model lobbying behavior using the so-called buying inuenceapproach, de-
veloped in the context of common-agency games with perfect information by Dixit et
al. (1997) and Grossman and Helpman (1994, 2001), building on previous work by
Bernheim and Whinston (1986a, 1986b). In this framework, interest groups compete
by o¤ering monetary rewards to the policy maker conditional on the types of policies
implemented (in the form, for instance, of campaign contributions), which are both
legal and public.
Formally, the lobbying game evolves along two stages and is solved backward using
the notion of subgame perfection. In the rst stage, the interest groups (the principals)
20Note that in the real world also tobacco producers, although competing in the market for their
products, often coordinate their lobbying activities by means of a lobby rm representing their collective
interests.
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present to the policy maker a menu of o¤ers (i.e., a series of contributions), each one
associated to a given set of policies. Upon acceptance of the o¤ers, the policy maker
picks her preferred choice in the second stage of the game. With this type of common
agency games, it is analytically convenient to focus on truthful, or compensating, con-
tribution functions of the type dened by Dixit et al. (1997). The feature of a truthful
contribution function is that of being shaped along an indi¤erence curve of the lobby
group, so that any given change in a policy instrument brings about a corresponding
change in the contribution that is equal to the variation in the payo¤ of the group
making the o¤er. A nice property of truthful contributions is that the set of the best
responses of each principal to the contribution functions (not necessarily truthful) of
the other principals always contains a truthful contribution schedule (Dixit et al., 1997,
proposition 2). Hence, compensating contributions functions solve also the problem of
equilibrium selection, since common agency games typically have multiple equilibria.
To dene the contribution functions of the lobby groups, we therefore need rst to
characterize their payo¤ functions. As for producers, their payo¤ is simply given by
their aggregate prots dened in Eq. (30). As for tobacco consumers, we assume that
smokers-as-a-group have policy preferences that are less biased than those prevailing
(on average) at the individual level, while not necessarily fully reecting their unbiased
welfare measure. Hence, we assume that smokers evaluate policy outcomes by means
of a convex linear combination of their truesurplus, mEF [w], with w dened in Eq.
(23), and their biasedsurplus
mEF [w
] +m fEF [(1  )x] +m g . (54)
As Eq. (54) shows, such a welfare measure is biased because it corresponds to the
aggregate measure of the utility functions describing smokerse¤ective behavior, which
reects both the lack of self control and the failure to account for the external costs of
smoking. Letting  2 [0; 1] be the weight given to the biased component dened in Eq.
(54), the objective function of smokers as a lobby group can be dened as
S = mEF [w] + m fEF [(1  )x] +m g . (55)
Turning nally to non-smokers, their surplus function (dened in Eq. (28)) shows that
they care for policies that raise tax revenue from tobacco consumption  since they
cash part of it as a subsidy  and that contribute to the abatement of the external costs
of smoking  since they are harmed by passive smoking. However, it is well known
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that citizensanti-tobacco movements do not generally pursue only selshgoals but
also altruistic ones, such as improving the health prospects of smokers (especially
the young ones).21 The latter observation suggests that a realistic specication of the
objective function for the group of non-smokers can be given by their own surplus
function, dened in Eq. (28), augmented by an additional term accounting for the
welfare costs due to tobacco consumption that smokers fail to internalize into their
objective function (55). Specically, we dene the payo¤ function of non-smokers-as-
a-group as
Z = (1 m) ~w   am fEF [(1  )x] +m g , (56)
where a 2 [0; 1] is a parameter expressing the degree of altruism of the group. The payo¤
function dened in Eq. (56) implies that the group of non-smokers favors policies that
reduce the external and the internal costs of smoking, and that maximize tax revenue.
Note that the latter goal does not conict with those aimed at discouraging tobacco
consumption, unless the equilibrium tax policy is located on the decreasing side of the
La¤er curve.
Using the objective functions dened above, the truthful contributions o¤ered by
rms (f), smokers (s) and non-smokers (ns), are
Cf(t; ; r;$f) = f max
n
0;m(t; ; r) $f
o
, (57)
Cs(t; ; r;$s) = cmax f0; S(t; ; r) $sg , (58)
Cns(t; ; r;$ns) = cmax f0; Z(t; ; r) $nsg , (59)
respectively, where $f , $s and $ns are non-negative scalars representing the net payo¤
of the lobby group. The parameters f 2 [0; 1] for rms and c 2 [0; 1] for both smokers
and non-smokers (where the superscript cstands for citizens) capture, in a reduced
form, how e¤ective the groups are in their lobbying activity. When i = 1, i = ff; cg,
the corresponding group is fully powerful in lobbying, while when i = 0 it does not
lobby at all (say, because of free-riding of its potential members). The assumption of a
21To illustrate the point, consider the stated purposes of two US based anti-smoking organizations.
Action on Smoking and Health (www.ash.org) envisions a world free of tobacco-related damage, disease
and death. This is accomplished by taking action to educate the public and decision makers, track
the tobacco industry, and work for sensible public policies. The Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids
organization (www.tobaccofreekids.org) advocates for public policies proven to prevent kids from
smoking, help smokers quit and protect everyone from second-hand smoke.
30
30
common parameter c for smokers and non-smokers is an analytically convenient one
that embraces the neutral view that the two groups are equally active in lobbying, since
there is no compelling empirical evidence about their relative strengths. As tax revenue
is uniformly rebated to smokers and non-smokers, and not to producers, the assumption
of equally powerful groups also implies that the impact of policy instruments on tax
revenue is irrelevant for the lobbying incentives of citizens.
Given the contribution functions (57)(59), the objective function of the policy
maker is

 + C f(t; ; r;$f) + Cs(t; ; r;$s) + Cns(t; ; r;$ns), (60)
where 
 is the per capita surplus dened in Eq. (31).
Focusing on the second stage of the lobbying game, policy choices under the inu-
ence of lobbying can be derived by maximizing22
V  = 
 + fm + cS + cZ. (61)
Taking into account that

 = mEF [w] + (1 m) ~w +m,
and substituting for S from Eq. (55) and for Z from Eq. (56), after some manipula-
tions the objective function (61) can be expressed as
V  =
V 
1 + c
= 
 + 1m fEF [(1  )x] +m g+ 2m, (62)
where
1 =
c(1  a)
1 + c
2

0;
1
2

, 2 =
f   c
1 + c
2

 1
2
; 1

. (63)
Eq. (62) highlights that there are two channels by which lobbying can distort the
choices of the policy maker away from the maximization of the economys aggregate
surplus 
. The rst, which is expressed by the weight 1, is due to smokerspressure
22We ignore the non-negativity constraints on the contribution functions. After solving for the second
stage of the game by maximizing Eq. (61) with respect to the policy instruments, one can solve for
the Nash equilibrium at the rst stage in the scalars $f , $s and $ns, and then check that the solution
implies positive contributions in equilibrium. However, we solve only for the second stage, since we are
interested only in the distorting impact of lobbying, and not on its distributional consequences among
the interested parties.
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for relaxing policies directed at reducing the external and the internal costs of tobacco
consumption. This term, which is directly related to the measure, , of the bias of
smokerspolicy preferences, is counterbalanced by the altruistic e¤orts of non-smokers,
as expressed by the index a. The distortion coming from smokerslobbying is maximal
when  = 1 and a = 0, whereas it is nil when a = 1, no matter the value of . Note
that lobbying by tobacco producers does not distort policies directed at reducing the
external and the internal costs of smoking, since the weight 1 does not depend on 
f .
The second possible source of distortion shown in Eq. (62) is due to the conicting
policy preferences of smokers and producers about prots. While the former favor
policies that reduce the prots of tobacco producers since this implies lower cigarettes
prices, the latter obviously make political pressure for policies that increase them. The
conict between the two groups is captured by the lobbying weight 2, which shows
that lobbying biases policies in favor of higher prots when tobacco producers are more
powerful lobbyists than smokers, i.e., when f > c, while the bias is in the opposite
direction if smokers are more powerful than producers.
In order to guarantee that the objective function (62) is concave in the policy
instruments (t; ), we let (see Appendix A.4)
n  22 > 0 and

01
>
n21
n  22
(k)2   (1  21)var(k). (64)
Note that the rst condition in Eq. (64) holds true for all admissible values of 2
if n  3, while it requires only that 2 < 1 if n = 2. Hence, for all market structures
but for the monopoly case, the condition is typically satised. The second condition
requires instead that the slope of the marginal cost of prevention policies, , is greater
than a given threshold that is increasing in the lobbying weights 1 and 2. Hence,
overall, the conditions in (64) introduce fairly weak restrictions.
The equilibrium tobacco control policies in the presence of lobbying are obtained by
maximizing Eq. (62) with respect to the policy instruments, leading to the following
proposition the proof of which is given in Appendix A.5.
Proposition 7 In the presence of lobbying, under the conditions in (64) and focusing
on internal solutions, the following statements hold true.
 For given  and r, the equilibrium tax rate is equal to
t(; r) =

1  (1 + n)1
n  22

(1  ()) + 0(1  r)2
  1 + 22
n  22
	(r), (65)
where 	(r) > 0 is dened in Eq. (37). t(; r) is decreasing in 1 and 2.
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 For given r, the equilibrium level of prevention policies, (r), is dened by the
solution in  of
 =
(1  1)(1  b)k var()  1EF [kx(t(; r); ; r)] =(01)
=(01) + (1  1)var(k)
. (66)
(r) is decreasing in 1 and 2.
 The equilibrium level of smoking bans, r, is dened by the solution in r of
20(1 r) Xujt=t((r);r) = 0102(1 r)2+
0

   121(var() + 
2
)

1  1
.
(67)
r is decreasing in 1.
 The equilibrium level of  is given by (r) and that of t by t((r); r).
In the special case in which c = f  meaning that all groups are equally e¤ective in
lobbying  and  = 0, or a = 1  meaning that either smokers as a lobbying group
have unbiased policy preferences, or non-smokers as a lobbying group are fully altruistic
(while smokers may have biased policy preferences)  the three groups end up perfectly
balancing each other (since 1 = 2 = 0) and lobbying is completely ine¤ective. In all
other cases, lobbying is instead capable of distorting public policy.
It is convenient to illustrate the results of Proposition 7 by considering rst the
impact of lobbying on the equilibrium level of smoking restrictions, and then on that
of prevention policies and taxation. Eq. (67) shows that an increase in the lobbying
weight 1, by increasing the marginal costs of smoking restrictions, distorts downward
their equilibrium level r. As noted above, the value of 1 expresses the conicting
pressures on policy by smokers on the one side and non-smokers on the other. Whenever
citizens are active in lobbying (i.e., c > 0), and smokers have biased policy preferences
(i.e.,  > 0), then 1 > 0 and the level of smoking restrictions is distorted downward by
lobbying unless non-smokers are fully altruistic (i.e., a = 1), in which case 1 = 0 and
smoking restrictions are set at their e¢ cient level. Note nally that producers do not
target smoking restrictions, since r does not depend on 2. The reason is that the
impact of r on prots is isomorphic to that of taxation (see Eqs. (14) and (16)). Hence,
once producers lobby for lower taxation (as argued below), it becomes redundant for
them to pressure also for weaker regulation.
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Turning to prevention policies, note that lobbying exerts both direct e¤ects 
which are expressed by the impact of the lobbying weights (1; 2) on 
 for given
r  and indirect e¤ects  which are channeled by the impact of lobbying on the
equilibrium level of smoking restrictions, r, illustrated above. Focusing our attention
on direct e¤ects only, Eq. (66) in Proposition 7 implies that (r) is a decreasing
function of both lobbying weights (1; 2). However, it also shows that while 1 a¤ects
the right hand side of Eq. (66) both directly and indirectly through its impact on
the equilibrium tax rate t(:), the weight 2 exerts only an indirect impact through
t(:). This means that the weight 1 is key for understanding the impact of lobbying
on prevention policies. Hence, as for smoking restrictions, the impact of lobbying on
prevention policies crucially depends on the conicting pressures of smokers and non-
smokers. In the case of prevention programs, however, also producers lobbying is
relevant, but only insofar as their political pressure, by impacting on the equilibrium
tax rate, also indirectly impacts on prevention programs.
Turning nally to taxation, Eq. (65) in Proposition 7 highlights that lobbying
directly targets in a distinctive manner two components of the equilibrium tax rate,
namely (i) the Pigouvian corrections for the average component of the health harm
not internalized by smokers because of their lack of self control and for the average
externality (since smoking restrictions are never maximal in equilibrium), and (ii) the
subsidy term correcting for the market power of tobacco producers. Eq. (65) shows
that the Pigouvian-tax component is distorted downward by lobbying if 1 > 0, that is
if citizens are active in lobbying (i.e., c > 0) and smokers have biased policy preferences
while non-smokers are not fully altruistic (i.e.,  > 0 and a < 1). Note also that the
distortion is larger the greater is 2, that is the more e¤ective are rms in lobbying
compared to citizens. If instead non-smokers are fully altruistic (i.e., a = 1), then
smokersand non-smokerslobbying e¤orts perfectly balance and they are ine¤ective
in distorting the Pigouvian component of taxation. As for the subsidy term, Eq. (65)
shows that the distortion depends on the weight 2, that is on the relative strength in
lobbying of tobacco producers and smokers. Since higher prots benet rms but they
harm consumers, the former lobby for a more generous subsidy while the latter call for
reducing it.
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6 Concluding remarks
This paper investigates the optimal design of policies controlling the consumption of
tobacco based on the joint use of three instruments: excise taxes, prevention programs
and smoking bans.
We nd that prevention policies and smoking restrictions can usefully complement
taxation in controlling tobacco consumption. While taxes can correct the average ex-
ternalities and internalities induced by smoking, the other two policy instruments ad-
dress the heterogeneity within the group of smokers. Furthermore, smoking restrictions
also help curbing externalities that are only partially corrected by uniform taxation, as
the latter can not properly account for the externalities imposed by smokers in di¤erent
environments.
Lobbying by tobacco rms, smokers and non-smokers is shown to target di¤erent
objectives. In equilibrium, producers mainly focus on reducing tobacco taxation, while
consumerslobbying (by both smokers and non-smokers) a¤ect prevention policies and
regulation in ways that depend on the intensity of their preferences.
The paper can be extended along several dimensions. While our analysis combines
three major policy instruments for controlling tobacco consumption, additional more
specic measures have been neglected, such as restrictions and bans on advertising
of tobacco products, or regulatory policies that target specic groups of individuals,
like youth access laws. Moreover, rms may combine lobbying of the policy maker
with activities aimed at directly a¤ecting consumerschoices, such as information cam-
paigns aimed at counteracting public prevention programs. The introduction of these
additional features into the analysis is a line of research to be pursued in the future.
In our model, an exogenous share of tobacco consumption (represented by the para-
meter ) occurs in locations in which smoking causes external costs to other individuals.
Moreover, we have assumed that smoking restrictions are applicable to all smoking loc-
ations in which externalities occur. However, it is clearly possible that smokers react
to stricter smoking bans by increasing their smoking in locations where a ban cannot
be enforced and in which an externality occurs (e.g. childrens second-hand smoking at
home). The latter is the issue examined, both theoretically and empirically, by Adda
and Cornaglia (2010), and it is clearly one that could further enrich our analysis.
Furthermore, our setting does not deal with the social aspects of smoking  i.e.
the fact that smoking habits may ensue from imitation and social interactions, a line of
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research that has been developed by Cutler and Glaeser (2010) and Sari (2013), among
others.
Finally, in our model, tobacco taxation is of the specic type. This notwithstanding,
in many countries also an ad valorem tax is used (in the EU, for instance, both VAT
and excises are levied on tobacco and alcoholic products). Since ad valorem and specic
taxation are not equivalent in oligopolistic markets (see, e.g. Myles, 1995), it might
be interesting to examine the optimal mix between the two types of taxes, and how
special interest groups target them.
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Appendix
A.1 Derivation of the utility function
We consider the case in which tobacco consumption occurs in a location that is subject to a
smoking ban, where it is assumed that gross surplus is uniformly distributed on the closed
interval [ ; 1=1   ], with 0 <  < 1=1. The case in which smoking occurs in an unrestricted
location obtains by simply setting  = 0.
Denote with s^ 2 [0; 1=1   ] a positive threshold level of the gross surplus. If, within the given
period of time, a smoker consumes only those units of x for which s  s^, then the expected
quantity consumed is equal to:
x(s^) =
Z 1=1 
s^
10 ds = 0 (1  1   s^1) . (A.1)
Recall that the total gross surplus from smoking is assumed to be equal to the sum of the gross
surpluses from the various consumption units (an assumption akin to that of risk neutrality).
Hence, the expected total gross surplus associated to the consumption of those units of x for
which s  s^ is equal to:
v(s^) =
Z 1=1 
s^
10sds =
10
2
 
1
1
  
2
  s^2
!
. (A.2)
Using the other assumptions introduced in Section 3.1 (i.e., the gross surplus of each unit of
the numeraire good z is equal to one; the perceived present value of future health harm is equal
to  for each unit of good x consumed; the consumer is price-taker), we can conclude that the
individual will consume only those units of good x for which s  s^  p + . The expected
demand of good x is then x(s^), as shown in Eq. (A.1). All income e¤ects fall on the quantity
consumed of good z.
The consumers problem can be expressed in the more familiar form in which the individual
chooses her consumption bundle (x; z) by maximizing a utility function subject to a budget
constraint, instead of choosing the threshold level of the gross surplus. To express the problem
in the latter format, invert Eq. (A.1) to get
s^(x) =
1
1
     x
10
,
and then substitute s^(x) into Eq. (A.2) to obtain
v(x) =
1
1

1  1  
x
20

x. (A.3)
Recalling that the utility of good z is linear with unitary slope, and that consumption xu in
unrestricted locations ( = 0) is a share 1  r of total consumption (while consumption xr in
restricted locations ( > 0) absorbs the remaining share r), from Eq. (A.3) we nally obtain
the utility function shown in Eq. (1).
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A nal remark is in order. Strictly speaking, Eq. (A.3) represents an expected utility function,
since it is assumed that the gross surpluses enjoyed from smoking follow a random process.
Similarly, the individual demand functions are in expected terms. However, if one focuses on a
su¢ ciently long period of time, the utility and demand functions can be taken as deterministic
objects, as it is done throughout in the paper.
A.2 Concavity of 
 in (t; )
By totally di¤erentiating the rst order derivatives shown in Eqs. (34) and (40), it is immediate
to see that the aggregate surplus 
 is a strictly concave function of (t; ) for given r. In fact:
@2

@t2
 m@p

@t
@X
@t
=  m

n
1 + n
2
01 < 0, (A.4)
@2

@2
 mEF

k +
@p
@

@x
@

   =  k2 @2

@t2
 m [var(k)01 + ] < 0, (A.5)
@2

@t@
 m

@p
@
+ k

@X
@t
= k
@2

@t2
< 0, (A.6)
@2

@t2
@2

@2
 

@2

@t@
2
  m@
2

@t2
(01 var(k) + ) > 0,
where for the latter inequality to hold true it is su¢ cient to assume that either var(k) > 0 or
 > 0.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 1
From Eq. (51) it is immediate to see that MB(0) > 0 and MB(1) = 0. By di¤erentiating it
with respect to r we get
@MB(r)
@r
= 20(1  r)
@Xu
@r
  20Xu =
= 4201
1 + n
n
20(1  r)2   20Xu R 0,
@2MB(r)
@r2
=  10201
1 + n
n
20(1  r) < 0,
which proves the rst part of the lemma.
From Eq. (50), it is immediate to see that MC(0) > 0 and MC(1) > 0. By di¤erentiating it
with respect to r we get
@MC(r)
@r
=  201

(r)  (1  r)@
@r

=  220(1  r)01 < 0,
@2MC(r)
@r2
= 2201
0 > 0,
which completes the proof of the second part of the lemma.
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A.4 Concavity of V  in (t; )
By di¤erentiating Eq. (62) with respect to t, we get
@V 
@t
=
@

@t
+ 1m(1  )
@X
@t
+ 1m
@ 
@t
+ 2m
@
@t
, (A.7)
where @X=@t and @ =@t, are dened in Eqs. (14) and (33), respectively, and where
@
@t
= (p   c  t) @X

@t
+

@p
@t
  1

X =   2
1 + n
X. (A.8)
Using the fact that
@2X
@t2
=
@2 
@t2
= 0,
@2
@t2
=   2
1 + n
@X
@t
=
2n
(1 + n)2
01,
and using the expression for @2
=@t2 dened in Eq. (A.4), we get
@2V 
@t2
=  m n
(1 + n)2
(n  22)01 < 0 i¤ n > 22. (A.9)
By di¤erentiating Eq. (62) with respect to , we have
@V 
@
=
@

@
+ 1mEF

(1  ) @x

@
  kx

+ 1m
@ 
@
+ 2m
@
@
, (A.10)
where @x=@ and @ =@ are dened in Eqs. (12) and (39), respectively, and where
@
@
= (p   c  t) @X

@
+
@p
@
X = k
@
@t
. (A.11)
Using Eq. (A.5) to write
@2

@2
= (k)2
@2

@t2
 mvar(k)01  m,
using the fact that
@2 
@2
= 0,
@2
@2
= (k)2
@2
@t2
,
and the fact that
@
@
EF

(1  ) @x

@
  kx

= 2

var(k) +
n
1 + n
(k)2

01,
we nally obtain
@2V 
@2
= (k)2
@2V 
@t2
 m

(1  21)var(k)  21
n
1 + n
(k)2

01  m. (A.12)
By di¤erentiating Eq. (A.7) with respect to , we get
@2V 
@t@
=
@2

@t@
 m1k
@X
@t
+m1
@2 
@t@
+m2
@2
@t@
.
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Since
@2

@t@
= k
@2

@t2
,
@2 
@t@
= 0,
@2
@t@
= k
@2
@t2
,
we obtain
@2V 
@t@
= k
@2V 
@t2
+m
n
1 + n
1
k01. (A.13)
Using Eqs. (A.9), (A.12) and (A.13), we then characterize the condition for which
@2V 
@t2
@2V 
@2
 

@2V 
@t@
2
> 0, (A.14)
which reduces to the second condition shown in Eq. (64). If conditions (A.14) and (A.9) hold
true, then the derivative (A.12) is negative. Hence the function V  is concave in (t; ).
A.5 Proof of Proposition 7
Using Eq. (32), from Eq. (A.7) we get the rst order condition for the equilibrium tax rate as:
1
m
@V 
@t
=

(p   c)  (1  1)(1  )
 @X
@t
  (1  1)
@ 
@t
+ 2
@
@t
= 0. (A.15)
Using Eqs. (A.8), (14) and (33) to substitute the corresponding expressions into Eq. (A.15),
and then solving for t, we obtain the equilibrium tax rate dened in Eq. (65). By simple
di¤erentiation, it is then immediate to see that t(:) is decreasing in 1 and 2.
Using Eqs. (40), (39) and (A.11), from Eq. (A.10) we dene the rst order condition for
the equilibrium level of  (interior solution) as
 (1  1)EF

(1  ) @x

@

  1EF [kx] + EF

(p   c)@x

@

+
 (1  1)k
@ 
@t
   + 2k
@
@t
= 0. (A.16)
By taking the expectation, and using Eqs. (12), (15) and (39), Eq. (A.16) can be written as
 (1  1)cov

(1  ); @x

@

  1EF [kx]   + k
1
m
@V 
@t
= 0. (A.17)
With t set at its equilibrium level, the last term in Eq. (A.17) is zero. By substituting Eq. (42)
for the covariance term into Eq. (A.17), we nally obtain Eq. (66) that denes the equilibrium
level (r) of prevention policies with t = t(; r).
Let R() be the right hand side of Eq. (66). The conditions for a unique interior solution
(r) are
R(0) = (1  1)(1  b)k var()  1EF [kx(t(0; r); 0; r)] =(01) > 0 (A.18)
and
@R
@
=   1
+ (1  1)var(k)01
@
@
EF [kx
(t(; r); ; r)] < 1. (A.19)
41
41
Condition (A.18) is always satised for 1 = 0. For 1 > 0, the solution for  is interior if
R(0) > 0, while it is a corner one at  = 0 if R(0)  0. Condition (A.19) is equivalent to the
second condition shown in Eq. (64), which guarantees concavity of the objective function V 
in (t; ). To see this, consider that
@
@
EF [kx
(t(; r); ; r)] =  

var(k) +
n1
n  22
(k)2

01,
so that it is immediate to see the equivalence between the conditions given in Eq. (64) and
that given in Eq. (A.19).
The impact of the lobby weights on  is obtained by implicit di¤erentiation of the following
identity:
  (1  1)(1 
b)k var()  1EF [kx(t(; r); ; r)] =(01)
=(01) + (1  1)var(k)
.
Taking into account the second order condition shown in Eq. (64), one obtains that
sign

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
=  sign
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) + (1 + 1var(k))EF [k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
k
@x
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@1

,
which is negative since @x=@t < 0 and @t=@1 < 0. Similarly, since
sign

@
@2

=  sign

1EF

k
@x
@t
@t
@2

,
one sees that  is decreasing in 2, since @t
=@2 < 0.
Consider nally the derivative of Eq. (62) with respect to r, i.e.
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=
1
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
@r
+ 1
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(1  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 @X
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
+ 2
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. (A.20)
Using Eq. (47), Eq. (A.20) can be written as
1
m
@V 
@r
=  EF [vu(xu)  vr(xr)]+(1 1)

1 + n
n

@ 
@t
+ 20(1  r)Xu

+
1
m
@V 
@t
.
(A.21)
With t set at its equilibrium level t(; r), the last term is zero. Therefore, using Eqs. (48) and
(49), the marginal costs and marginal benets functions of policy r in the presence of lobbying
are dened as
MC(r;1) = (1  1)0102(1  r)2 + 0

   1
2
1(var() +

2
)

, (A.22)
MB(r;1) = (1  1)20(1  r) Xujt=t(;r) . (A.23)
An interior solution for r is then dened by the following equation:
20(1  r) Xujt=t(;r) = 0102(1  r)2 +
0

   121(var() + 
2
)

1  1
. (A.24)
Since the functions MC(r;1) and MB(r;1) share the same properties, up to the scalar 1,
of, respectively, the functions MC(r) and MB(r), characterized in Lemma 1, from Eq. (A.24)
it is immediate to see that the interior solution r(1) is decreasing in 1.
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Table 1: U.S. States Cigarette tax rates, Tax revenue, Tobacco control programs, Total Alciati score, Smoke free air laws index
CTR REV TCP ALC SFAL CTR REV TCP ALC SFAL
(¢ p.p.) ($ p.c.) ($ p.c.) (index 0-39) (index 0-46) (¢ p.p.) ($ p.c.) ($ p.c.) (index 0-39) (index 0-46)
2014 2011 2011 2006 2008 2014 2011 2011 2006 2008
Alabama 42,5 (1) 29,01 1,52 15 14 Nebraska      64,0 33,87 2,52 10 16
Alaska 200,0 85,05 15,73 14 13 Nevada 80,0 36,27 3,23 15 43
Arizona 200,0 50,66 3,43 9 45 New Hampshire 178,0 165,30 1,15 20 19
Arkansas 115,0 68,18 4,78 16 38 New Jersey 270,0 88,83 0,34 20 46
California 87,0 22,42 2,41 25 31 New Mexico          166,0 44,80 4,17 22 38
Colorado 84,0 33,56 1,91 14 46 New York 435,0 (1) 79,32 3,61 26 39
Connecticut 340,0 109,32 0,60 22 28 North Carolina 45,0 27,08 2,21 11 3
Delaware 160,0 138,56 10,94 21 41 North Dakota 44,0 29,88 13,94 12 31
Florida 133,9 (2) 65,63 3,64 13 38 Ohio 125,0 70,68 0,76 12 41
Georgia 37,0 19,82 0,62 15 30 Oklahoma 103,0 63,10 6,41 25 32
Hawaii 320,0 98,67 7,81 13 44 Oregon 131,0 54,89 2,70 16 26
Idaho 57,0 25,59 2,00 26 35 Pennsylvania 160,0 90,02 1,82 15 38
Illinois 198,0 (1) 44,35 1,43 9 41 Rhode Island 350,0 125,96 3,78 18 41
Indiana 99,5 68,75 1,73 17 4 South 57,0 29,56 2,16 14 13
Iowa 136,0 66,63 3,73 18 46 South Dakota        153,0 66,28 6,00 13 34
Kansas 79,0 33,31 1,13 14 17 Tennessee 62,0
(1)(
3) 44,60 0,42 27 16
Kentucky 60,0 (3) 61,75 1,05 19 2 Texas 141,0 52,86 0,76 29 5
Louisiana 36,0 28,14 2,38 17 42 Utah 170,0 37,12 3,15 16 39
Maine 200,0 102,25 8,98 24 34 Vermont 262,0 108,41 9,65 28 33
Maryland 200,0 68,47 1,11 7 41 Virginia 30,0 (1) 19,89 1,41 16 11
Massachusetts 351,0 85,51 1,68 9 41 Washington 302,5 63,56 3,07 28 42
Michigan 200,0 92,94 0,64 13 15 West Virginia 55,0 59,27 4,01 12 4
Minnesota 283,0 (4) 80,60 4,05 16 17 Wisconsin 252,0 106,60 1,66 17 14
Mississippi 68,0 45,99 4,70 18 8 Wyoming             60,0 42,03 12,14 25 n.a.
Missouri 17,0 (1) 15,46 1,05 16 20 Dist. of Columbia   250,0 (5) 58,85 6,51 12 42
Montana 170,0 76,54 9,75 22 38 U.S. Median 136,0 61,75 2,52 16 34
REV and TCP data: http://apps.nccd.cdc.gov/statesystem/TrendReport/TrendReports.aspx; ALC and SFAL data: http://www.impacteen.org/tobaccodata.htm
ALC: Total Alciati score (min: 0, max: 39). Source: ImpactTeen. The index measures the extensiveness of state tobacco control youth access laws as, for instance, the level of restrictions for minimum age 
provision, the degree of provisions for photo identification requirements to buy tobacco products, the level of restrictions on selling tobacco products through a vending machine, the degree of graduated 
penalties to retailers for violation of youth access laws, and so on. Source: ImpacTEEN.
SFAL: Smoke Free Air Laws index (min: 0, max: 46). Source: ImpactTeen. The index is an aggregate measure of the level of SFA restrictions by state laws in 12 classified sites: government worksites, 
private worksites, child care centers, health care facilities, restaurants, recreational and cultural facilities, public transit, shopping malls, public and private schools, free standing bars. This aggregate 
measure is our own computation from the disaggregated data computed by ImpacTEEN.
CTR: Excise tax rate in USD cents per pack of 20 cigarettes. Source: Federation of Tax Administrators, January 1, 2014. Available at http://www.taxadmin.org/fta/rate/cigarette.pdf
(1) Counties and cities may impose an additional tax on a pack of cigarettes in AL, 1¢ to 6¢; IL, 10¢ to 15¢; MO, 4¢ to 7¢; NYC $1.50; TN, 1¢; and VA, 2¢ to 15¢.  (2) Florida's rate includes a surcharge of 
$1 per pack.  (3) Dealers pay an additional enforcement and administrative fee of 0.1¢ per pack in KY and 0.05¢ in TN.  (4) In addition, Minnesota imposes an in lieu cigarette sales tax determined annually 
by the Department. The current rate is 36.2¢ through December 31, 2013.  (5) In addition, DC imposes an in lieu cigarette sales tax calculated every March 31. The current rate is 36¢.
STATE STATE
REV: Annual gross tax revenue from cigarette sales in USD, per capita. Data are based on fiscal years ending June 30. Source: CDC-STATE System: Trend Report.
TCP: Total funds allocated for tobacco control programs, in USD, per capita, summed from state, federal, ALF, and RWJF funding sources. Source: CDC-STATE System: Trend Report.
43
year (1) Tobacco (3) Oil & Gas (4) Alcoholic Beverage (5) Tobacco Oil & gas
Alcoholic 
Beverage Tobacco (8) Oil & Gas (9)
Alcoholic 
Beverage (10)
2004 7.472 15.598 17.378 20.066.022 62.192.773 11.972.790 7.440.242 27.249.201 6.987.084
2005 2.074 4.134 4.986 20.745.443 68.868.880 12.200.382 7.408.184 33.102.179 7.075.242
2006 94.855 126.628 30.055 22.356.489 72.092.535 12.536.145 7.350.661 35.113.131 7.182.329
2007 14.243 6.812 7.254 23.022.449 73.388.159 12.837.894 7.194.012 35.539.118 7.231.414
2008 5.996 55.546 17.770 23.434.774 73.402.161 13.169.406 6.851.714 34.441.243 7.420.959
2009 3.460 7.724 6.941 28.715.866 71.399.512 13.322.406 11.548.854 33.569.490 7.423.710
2010 11.059 66.688 43.875 33.181.062 71.651.833 13.502.184 15.913.566 33.714.319 7.474.915
2011 6.590 15.855 21.364 33.172.167 74.969.659 13.830.991 15.518.459 33.742.304 7.590.691
2012 58.317 80.476 36.776 na na na 15.005.872 33.659.652 7.852.331
2013 6.825 26.288 15.238 na na na 14.323.320 33.607.917 7.849.067
2014 7.401 95.965 33.852 na na na na na na
2004-2011 145.750 298.985 149.624 204.694.272 567.965.512 103.372.198 79.225.692 266.470.985 58.386.344
(2)/(6)*100 0,071 0,053 0,145
Political Contributions (2) Federal Excise Tax Revenue (7)Federal, State and Local Excise Tax Revenue (6)
Table 2: Political Contributions and Excise Tax Revenues in Three Sectors of the US Economy (thousands of $)
(1) Election year when focusing on political contributions
(8) Tax revenue from domestic tobacco products
(9) Tax revenue from manufacturer's excise taxes on gasoline and diesel fuel, except for trains and intercity buses
(10) Tax revenue on domestic distilled spirits, wine and beer
(2) Contributions to candidates and committees, at the Federal, State and Local level. Source: followthemoney.org (accessed December 18, 2014)
(3) Follow the Money's industry classification: Tobacco companies & tobacco product sales (general business) and Tobacco (agriculture)
(4) Follow the Money's industry classification: Oil & gas (energy & natural resources)
(5) Follow the Money's industry classification: Beer, wine & liquor (general business)
(7) Federal excise taxes reported to or collected by the Internal Revenue Service, Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau, and Customs Service, by type of excise tax, fiscal 
years 1999-2013 (Historical Table 20, IRS, accessed December 18, 2014)
(6) Federal tax revenue (7) plus State and Local excise tax revenues. The data source for State and Local excise tax revenues is the State & Local Government Finance Data Query 
System. http://slfdqs.taxpolicycenter.org/pages.cfm. The Urban Institute-Brookings Institution Tax Policy Center. Data from U.S. Census Bureau, Annual Survey of State and 
Local Government Finances, Government Finances, Volume 4, and Census of Governments (1977-2011). Date of Access: (29-Jul-2013).
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Table 3: Donations to selected U.S. States Ballot Measures on Tobacco related issues from 2002 to 2012
n. of cmtes contributions (USD) n. of cmtes contributions (USD)
PROPOSITION 29 (PRIMARY) California 2012 Tax increase earmarked for cancer research 3 18,347,472 2 48,051,888 FAILED
PROPOSITION B Missouri 2012 Tax increase earmarked for prevention programs 1 4,436,027 2 6,960,759 FAILED
PROPOSITION 302 Arizona 2010 Repeal of earmarking of tax revenue 1 35,600 3 1,131,940 FAILED
MEASURE 50 Oregon 2007 Tax increase earmarked for welfare programs 6 4,135,262 2 12,133,898 FAILED
AMENDMENT 3 Missouri 2006 Tax increase earmarked for prevention programs 1 6,998,752 3 6,209,057 FAILED
AMENDMENT 4 Florida 2006 Earmarking of tax revenue for prevention programs 1 5,153,604 0 0 PASSED
MEASURE 2 South Dakota 2006 Tax increase earmarked for prevention programs 1 423,380 6 230,034 PASSED
PROPOSITION 203 Arizona 2006 Tax increase earmarked for welfare programs 2 3,469,464 1 9,451 PASSED
PROPOSITION 86 California 2006 Tax increase earmarked for welfare programs 2 16,607,128 5 66,682,899 FAILED
AMENDMENT 35 Colorado 2004 Tax increase earmarked for welfare programs 1 2,079,750 1 237,394 PASSED
I-149 Montana 2004 Tax increase and change in earmarking 1 249,800 1 98,997 PASSED
STATE QUESTION 713 Oklahoma 2004 New tax in place of the old one 1 1,199,068 1 2,074,664 PASSED
PROPOSITION 303 Arizona 2002 Tax increase 2 1,487,688 0 0 PASSED
INITIATED STATUTORY 
MEASURE 4 North Dakota 2012 Introduction of smoking bans 1 84,120 0 0 PASSED
REFERRED LAW 12 South Dakota 2010 Expansion of State smoking ban 4 418,830 1 197,175 PASSED
ISSUE 5 (**) Ohio 2006 Introduction of smoking ban in public places 1 2,686,758 2 6,742,639 PASSED
PROPOSITION 201 (**) Arizona 2006 Tax increase earmarked for prevention programs; Introduction of smoking ban in public places 1 1,810,401 2 8,805,169 PASSED
QUESTION 5 (**) Nevada 2006 Introduction of smoking ban in public places 1 617,038 2 2,354,350 PASSED
INITIATIVE 901 Washington 2005 Expansion of State smoking ban 1 1,594,441 1 33,171 PASSED
Source: National Institute on Money in State Politics (http://www.followthemoney.org/)
data avaliable following the links Explore - Ballot measures by subject (accessed February 22,2014)
(*) A detailed description is given in Table 3bis
(**) Multiple ballot measures (see Table 3bis). The contributions shown in the table are referred to the multiple ballot. 
Pro Committees Con Committees
Measure State Year Brief description (*) Status
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Table 3bis: Detailed description of the Ballot Measures reported in Table 3
Measure
PROPOSITION 29 (PRIMARY)
PROPOSITION B
PROPOSITION 302
MEASURE 50
AMENDMENT 3
AMENDMENT 4
MEASURE 2
PROPOSITION 203
PROPOSITION 86
AMENDMENT 35
I-149
STATE QUESTION 713
PROPOSITION 303
INITIATED STATUTORY MEASURE 4
REFERRED LAW 12
ISSUE 5
(multiple ballot measure)
PROPOSITION 201
(multiple ballot measure)
QUESTION 5
(multiple ballot measure)
INITIATIVE 901
Imposes additional five cent tax on each cigarette distributed ($1.00 per pack), and an equivalent tax increase on other tobacco products, to fund cancer research and other 
specified purposes.
This measure would repeal the Arizona Early Childhood Development and Health Initiative, redirecting tobacco tax revenues into the state's general fund.
Increase tobacco tax and use funds to provide healthcare for children. Prevent tobacco use.
Amendment 3 would impose an 80 cent-per-pack tax on cigarettes to fund programs to reduce and prevent tobacco use.
Would create the Health and Education Trust Fund with proceeds of a tax of $0.0365 per cigarette and 25 percent of the manufacturer's invoice price for roll-your-own 
tobacco and 15 percent for other tobacco products
Amendment 4 would require the state to use some tobacco settlement money annually for a statewide tobacco education and prevention program.
Measure 2 would increase the tax on cigarettes and tobacco products. The proposed law would deposit up to $30 million of tobacco tax revenue into the state general fund, 
the next $5 million, if any, would be deposited into the tobacco prevention and reduction trust fund.
Proposition 303 would increase the state tax on cigarettes, cigars and other tobacco products.
This measure would expand the state smoking ban to include all restaurants, bars, liquor stores, Deadwood casinos, and video lottery establishments. The ban does not 
extend to existing cigar bars, tobacco shops, or designated smoking rooms in hotels.
Issue 5 would ban smoking in public places (SmokeFree Ohio). Issue 4 is an alternative to Issue 5, and would ban smoking in public places but exempts bars, restaurants, 
and other locations. Issue 5 passed while Issue 4 failed. Committees supported/opposed multiple ballot measures.
Proposition 203 would establish an Early Childhood Development and Health Fund, consisting of revenues generated by an increase in the state tax on tobacco products, 
donations and state appropriations. The state tax on cigarettes would increase from $1.18 per pack to $1.98 per pack, and the tax on other types of tobacco products would 
be increased by a similar amount.
Proposition 86 would impose an additional 13 cent tax on each cigarette distributed ($2.60 per pack), and indirectly increases tax on other tobacco products. The funds 
generated from this increased tax would go towards health care and health insurance programs.
Amendment 35 would raise taxes on tobacco products and require that the new revenue be used for health care services and tobacco education programs.
I-149 would increase tobacco taxes by almost 140 percent and change the use of these tax revenues.
This measure would prohibit smoking, including the use of electronic smoking devices, in public places and worksites
Proposition 201 would prohibit smoking in all public places and places of employment, except in tobacco shops, outdoor patios, veterans and fraternal clubs when they are 
not open to the public, and hotel rooms designated as smoking rooms. The measure would also increase the state tax on cigarettes from $1.18 per pack to $1.20 per pack. 
Revenues collected from this tax would pay for enforcement and education costs. Proposition 206 is an alternative to Proposition 201, and would prohibit smoking in 
enclosed public places and places of employment, except bars and certain areas of restaurants, tobacco shops, outdoor patios, veterans and fraternal clubs when they are 
not open to the public, and hotel rooms designated as smoking rooms. Proposition 201 passed while Proposition 206 failed. Committees supported/opposed multiple ballot 
measures.
Question 5 would prohibit smoking in certain public places, in all bars with a food-handling license, but would exclude gaming areas of casinos and certain other locations. 
The measure would also allow local governments to adopt tobacco control measures stricter than those in question 5. Question 4 would prohibit smoking in certain public 
places, except all areas of casinos, gaming areas within establishments holding gaming licenses, bars and certain other locations. The measure would also provide that 
only the Nevada legislature may regulate the smoking of tobacco. Question 5 passed while Question 4 failed. Committees supported/opposed multiple ballot measures. 
Initiative 901 would prohibit smoking in public places and in places of employment, including restaurants, bars, taverns, bowling alleys and tobacco shops.
Description
Question 713 would end the sales taxes on cigarettes and tobacco products and replace it with a new tax. It also would make several income tax changes.
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